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ABSTRACT 
Several cross-country studies have observed a negative correlation between inequality 
and interpersonal trust. Using data from 59 countries, I instrument for inequality using 
the relative size of the mature-aged cohort, and find that a rise in inequality reduces trust. 
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1. Trust, Inequality, and Ethnic Heterogeneity
 
Economic theory has shown that the payoff in repeated games can be higher under conditions 
in which the players trust one another. In a society with high levels of generalized trust, 
individuals may be more willing to contract with others. In the presence of imperfect 
information, costly enforcement or coordination failures, high levels of trust can raise 
economic efficiency (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004).  
 
But what determines why some communities are more trusting than others? Two potentially 
important factors are ethnic heterogeneity and income inequality – both of which have been 
shown to be negatively correlated with trust. Across US cities (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) 
and across Australian neighborhoods (Leigh 2006), ethnic heterogeneity appears to be more 
important than inequality. But cross-national studies have typically found that the negative 
relationship between trust and income inequality dominates (Knack and Keefer 1997; Uslaner 
2002). Most of these studies do not deal with the possibility of reverse causation – that 
inequality might itself be affected by trust. 
 
Supposing inequality or ethnic heterogeneity affect trust, what are the causal channels 
through which this effect could operate? Summarizing the literature on heterogeneity and 
cooperation, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) suggest that (a) homogeneous 
communities might be better at solving collective action problems because members have 
similar tastes; (b) individuals might dislike working with others outside their group; (c) 
heterogeneity may lead to disagreement over how to share public goods; and (d) 
heterogeneity might undermine the ability to devise mechanisms that sustain trust and 
cooperation. In the case of inequality, they also suggest that an unequal distribution of 
resources might favor rent-seeking in the case of common pool resources. 
 
Alternatively, causation might run the opposite direction. One way in which trust might affect 
inequality is if low levels of trust lead to less provision of public goods, and higher levels of 
post-tax inequality. Alternatively, trust might affect ethnic heterogeneity, for example if 
countries with high levels of trust are less inclined to admit immigrants. 
 
 2. Empirical Strategy and Results
 
One way to identify whether inequality has a causal effect on trust is to find an instrument 
that is correlated with inequality, and is only likely to be correlated with trust through its 
effect on inequality. A useful candidate is cohort size. Higgins and Williamson (2002) point 
out that because “fat cohorts” tend to get low rewards, earnings inequality will be reduced 
when there is a labor market glut at the top of the age-earnings curve, and increased when 
there is a glut of old or young adults. They show that the ratio of the size of the cohort aged 
between 40 and 59 to the population aged 15 to 69 is a powerful predictor of inequality, both 
across and within countries. The distribution of the population along the age-earnings curve 
should affect inequality, but ought not have any direct impact on trust, except through the 
channel of inequality. 
 
To test this, I use data from the European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File. 
After merging in some additional variables from other datasets, my sample covers 82,778 
respondents in 59 countries. Forty-eight of the countries were surveyed in 1999-2000, and 11 
countries were surveyed in 1995-97 (these are all countries that were not surveyed in 1999-
2000). As a measure of trust, respondents were asked “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. 
Respondents who said “most people can be trusted” were coded as 1, while those who said 
that “you need to be very careful dealing with people” were coded as 0.1 The data were then 
collapsed to the country level. 
 
As a measure of inequality, I use the gini coefficient, which is a measure of the income gap 
between any two randomly selected individuals in the population, and is therefore the most 
appropriate measure of inequality for this purpose. Gini coefficients are drawn from the 
World Income Inequality Database, taking care to use only measures of income inequality 
that cover the entire population (on the comparability of inequality measures, see Atkinson 
and Brandolini 2001). Two other national-level controls are also included: the log of GDP per 
capita in international dollars at purchasing power parity (from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators data base), and a Herfindahl-type index of ethnic fractionalization, 
                                                 
1. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) argue that this question may be measuring the respondent’s 
trustworthiness, rather than how trusting they are. Since I am primarily interested in the aggregate level of trust 
in a society, my findings will be essentially unaffected by whether respondents are reporting their own trust 
level (the Glaeser et al interpretation) or that of those around them (the conventional interpretation).  
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 measuring the chance that two randomly selected people in a country are from the same 
group (from Alesina et al 2003). Table 1 presents summary statistics.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD 
Trust 0.289 0.155 
Gini 0.400 0.113 
Log GDP per capita 9.068 1.014 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.331 0.228 
Mature cohort 0.299 0.052 
 
The relationship between inequality and trust is depicted in Figure 1, which indicates a strong 
negative association between the two variables. The more unequal a country is, the fewer of 
its residents believe that most people can be trusted. 
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Figure 1: Trust and Inequality
 
 
Table 2 estimates the relationship between inequality and trust in a simple OLS specification, 
controlling for average per-capita income and ethnic heterogeneity. A 10 point increase in the 
gini coefficient is associated with a 5 percentage point fall in the fraction of the population 
who agree that most people can be trusted. Trust is positively associated with average per-
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 capita income, and negatively associated with ethnic fractionalization, though these 
relationships are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
Table 2: Country-Level Specification (OLS) 
Dependent variable: Whether respondent believes that most people can be 
trusted 
Gini -0.466*** 
 [0.156] 
Log GDP per capita 0.024 
 [0.019] 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.119 
 [0.084] 
Countries 59 
R2 0.29 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. 
 
In Table 3, I use the size of the mature-aged cohort (the ratio of the size of the cohort aged 
between 40 and 59 to the population aged 15 to 69) as an instrument for inequality. The first 
stage regression is strong and significant, with approximately a one-to-one relationship 
between the relative size of the mature-aged cohort and the gini coefficient. Using this 
instrumental variables approach, the second stage of the regression is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The magnitude of the effect is slightly larger in 
the IV specification than in the OLS specification. The coefficient suggests that a 10 point 
rise in the gini coefficient would lead to a 6 percent fall in the fraction of people agreeing that 
most people can be trusted.  
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Table 3: Country-Level Specification (IV) 
First Stage
 Dependent variable: Gini coefficient 
Size of mature cohort -1.022*** 
 [0.340] 
Log GDP per capita -0.021 
 [0.017] 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.073 
 [0.052] 
Countries 59 
R2 0.47 
Partial R2 on excluded instrument 0.18 
 
Second Stage
 Dependent variable: Trust 
Gini -0.573* 
 [0.310] 
Log GDP per capita 0.018 
 [0.021] 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.107 
 [0.087] 
Countries 59 
R2 0.29 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. 
 
An alternative approach is to run the regressions at an individual level, controlling for the 
respondent’s years of schooling, gender, marital status, age and age2, but clustering standard 
errors at a country level. Note that by carrying out the regression at an individual level, rather 
than collapsing all data to the country level, it is possible to instrument with the size of the 
mature-aged cohort, controlling for the age of the individual respondent (helping to satisfy 
the exclusion restriction for the instrument). The tables below show results using this 
strategy.  
 
Table 4 presents results using a probit model and a linear probability model (to allow 
comparison with the IV results in Table 5). In both cases, there is a significant negative 
relationship between inequality and trust, with a 10 point rise in the gini associated with a 4 
percentage point fall in trust. Average per-capita income is positively associated with trust, 
and ethnic heterogeneity is negatively associated with trust, though both are less statistically 
significant than the inequality/trust relationship. Those with more education, men, and older 
respondents tend to be more trusting, though the age effect diminishes over time. 
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Table 4: Individual-Level Specifications (Probit and Linear Probability Models) 
Dependent variable: Whether respondent believes that most people can be trusted 
 (1) (2) 
 Probit OLS 
Gini -0.393** -0.354** 
 [0.177] [0.162] 
Log GDP per capita 0.026 0.028* 
 [0.017] [0.017] 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.138* -0.131* 
 [0.082] [0.078] 
Years of school 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] 
Female -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] 
Married 0.004 0.003 
 [0.011] [0.010] 
Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
Age2 /1000 -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 [0.015] [0.014] 
Countries 59 59 
Individuals 82,778 82,778 
R2 or Pseudo-R2 0.03 0.04 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, with 
robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in brackets. Column 1 shows marginal 
probabilities from a probit model. 
 
Table 5 shows results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in Table 3. 
When the size of the mature aged cohort is used to instrument for inequality in an individual-
level specification, clustering standard errors at the country level, the effect of inequality on 
trust is negative and significant, with a coefficient around -0.6. 
 6
  
Table 5: Individual-Level Specification (IV) 
First Stage
 Dependent variable: Gini coefficient 
Size of mature cohort -1.010*** 
 [0.364] 
Log GDP per capita -0.019 
 [0.018] 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.09 
 [0.055] 
Individuals 82,778 
Countries 59 
R2 0.49 
Partial R2 on excluded instrument 0.16 
 
Second Stage
 Dependent variable: Trust 
Gini -0.613** 
 [0.296] 
Log GDP per capita 0.016 
 [0.020] 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.096 
 [0.084] 
Individuals 82,778 
Countries 59 
R2 0.04 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Coefficients are from a linear probability model, with robust standard errors, clustered at the 
country level, in brackets. Both regressions also control for years of schooling, gender, 
marital status, age and age2. A linear probability model is used in preference to a probit, since 
Stata’s probit IV module does not facilitate the use of analytic weights and clustering of 
standard errors. 
 
3. Conclusion
 
Instrumenting for inequality with the relative size of a country’s mature age cohort indicates 
that across countries, inequality has a causal effect of lowering trust. The finding that 
inequality matters more than ethnic heterogeneity is the opposite of what has been found 
across US cities and Australian neighborhoods. Three possible ways in which these results 
could be reconciled are that these two nations are exceptional; that inequality measures are 
more comparable across countries than measures of ethnic heterogeneity; or that trust is 
affected by ethnic diversity at the local level, and inequality at the national level.  
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 Data Appendix 
 
Gini coefficients are from the World Income Inequality Database, version 2.0a (June 2005), 
available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. Observations were used that met the 
following criteria: (a) the estimate was for income rather than consumption or expenditure; 
(b) the income-sharing unit was not the tax unit; (c) the estimate covered the full geographic 
area of the country; (d) the estimate covered the entire population; and (e) the gini was 
calculated in 1990 or later, but not later than the trust survey. Where there were multiple 
observations that met these five criteria, I used the most recent observation.  
 
Mature cohort is the ratio of the size of the population aged between 40 and 59 to the 
population aged 15 to 69. Population data from the US Census Bureau’s International Data 
Base, available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsprd.html. In all cases, I use the most 
recent year of data available. 
 
Log GDP per capita is measured in international dollars, converted at purchasing power 
parity, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005/index.html. Respondents in the 1995-97 wave were 
assigned the figure for 1995, while respondents in the 1999-2000 wave were assigned the 
figure for 1999.  
 
Ethnic fractionalization indices are from Alesina et al (2003), available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/. 
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Country-Level Data 
Country Trust Gini Log GDP 
per 
capita 
Ethnic 
Fractiona
lization 
Mature 
cohort 
WVS 
Wave 
ARM 0.247 0.625 7.421 0.127 0.273 1995
AUS 0.399 0.292 9.972 0.093 0.350 1995
AUT 0.339 0.292 10.187 0.107 0.330 1999
AZE 0.205 0.345 7.423 0.205 0.252 1995
BEL 0.307 0.322 10.126 0.555 0.334 1999
BGD 0.235 0.412 7.286 0.045 0.236 1999
BLR 0.419 0.247 8.396 0.322 0.330 1999
BRA 0.028 0.592 8.761 0.541 0.269 1995
CAN 0.388 0.365 10.180 0.712 0.340 1999
CHE 0.410 0.359 10.143 0.531 0.349 1995
CHL 0.228 0.595 9.063 0.186 0.271 1999
CHN 0.545 0.390 8.158 0.154 0.256 1999
COL 0.108 0.637 8.672 0.601 0.243 1995
DEU 0.348 0.292 10.123 0.168 0.357 1999
DNK 0.665 0.350 10.228 0.082 0.356 1999
DOM 0.264 0.502 8.371 0.429 0.231 1995
EGY 0.379 0.542 8.116 0.184 0.261 1999
ESP 0.362 0.345 9.846 0.417 0.317 1999
EST 0.228 0.366 9.114 0.506 0.349 1999
FIN 0.580 0.270 10.065 0.132 0.361 1999
FRA 0.222 0.282 10.083 0.103 0.328 1999
GBR 0.297 0.346 10.065 0.121 0.343 1999
GEO 0.187 0.576 7.240 0.492 0.322 1995
GRC 0.237 0.323 9.657 0.158 0.347 1999
HRV 0.184 0.350 9.022 0.369 0.354 1999
HUN 0.218 0.259 9.372 0.152 0.351 1999
IDN 0.516 0.396 7.970 0.735 0.248 1999
IRL 0.352 0.301 10.204 0.121 0.325 1999
ISR 0.235 0.357 9.847 0.344 0.270 1999
ITA 0.326 0.363 10.072 0.115 0.342 1999
JOR 0.277 0.384 8.254 0.593 0.201 1999
JPN 0.431 0.319 10.117 0.012 0.390 1999
KOR 0.273 0.372 9.542 0.002 0.291 1999
LTU 0.249 0.355 9.012 0.322 0.336 1999
LUX 0.260 0.262 10.767 0.530 0.342 1999
LVA 0.171 0.327 8.853 0.587 0.356 1999
MDA 0.147 0.437 7.144 0.554 0.299 1999
MEX 0.213 0.535 9.026 0.542 0.227 1999
NLD 0.598 0.255 10.166 0.105 0.336 1999
NOR 0.653 0.358 10.240 0.059 0.324 1995
NZL 0.491 0.370 9.746 0.397 0.312 1995
PAK 0.308 0.410 7.506 0.710 0.243 1999
PER 0.107 0.493 8.431 0.657 0.250 1999
PHL 0.084 0.495 8.223 0.239 0.243 1999
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 POL 0.189 0.345 9.141 0.118 0.316 1999
PRT 0.100 0.347 9.703 0.047 0.331 1999
RUS 0.237 0.425 8.780 0.245 0.325 1999
SGP 0.169 0.378 9.945 0.386 0.260 1999
SLV 0.146 0.521 8.305 0.198 0.236 1995
SVK 0.157 0.264 9.300 0.254 0.311 1999
SWE 0.663 0.272 10.047 0.060 0.361 1999
TUR 0.157 0.484 8.661 0.320 0.254 1999
UGA 0.076 0.546 7.076 0.930 0.202 1999
UKR 0.272 0.363 8.231 0.474 0.346 1999
USA 0.358 0.457 10.400 0.490 0.376 1999
VEN 0.159 0.458 8.609 0.497 0.231 1999
VNM 0.413 0.367 7.532 0.238 0.216 1999
ZAF 0.118 0.601 9.120 0.752 0.245 1999
ZWE 0.119 0.731 7.933 0.387 0.205 1999
Note: WVS wave refers to whether the trust data were collected in the 1995-97 wave 
(denoted 1995), or the 1999-2000 wave (denoted 1999). 
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